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Abstract
This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in
Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental
investigation of this result might be interesting.
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In this note, I investigate endogenous abstention by considering a positive cost of participating
in a meeting for decision-making.1 I choose a model with the number of members being ﬁnite,
actually three. In this sense, if that is literally taken, the target of this paper is not for so called
The Paradox of Voting,a sB ¨ orgers (2003) emphasizes.2 We may also interpret this situation as
when there are three populated groups (say, senior creditors, junior creditors and share holders in
corporate reorganization processes) and each representative has one vote.
Ic o n ﬁne my attention to the case where there are two alternatives to avoid such a problem as
Condorcet paradox. I call one of the two alternatives a majority opinion in a society if the number
of supporters for that alternative is larger than that of supporters for the other alternative, which
is called a minority opinion. By assuming that each member has to pay the same participation
cost to go to a meeting place, I analyze how each member in the majority and in minority behave
differently in equilibrium.
In an inﬂuential paper, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) show that there are typically two types of
equilibria in this type of game: one is where all voters choose mixed strategies (which are different
depending on whether he is in majority or in minority) over whether he abstains or goes to vote,
and the other includes some voters who deﬁnitely abstain and those who deﬁnitely go to vote.
Their main focus is on the asymptotic properties of these equilibria: when the number of voters is
very large, the probability of going to vote tends to be zero for all the voters in the former type of
equilibrium, whichseemsanaturalconsequence. But, thesecondtypeofequilibriumdoesnothave
such a property. On the contrary, this note shows that when there are three voters a unique mixed
Nash equilibrium obtains in Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1983) costly voting game under complete
information.3 Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) do not ﬁnd or at least do not mention the uniqueness
r e s u l tw h e nt h en u m b e ro fv o t e r si st h r e e .T h ei n t u i t i v er e a s o nf o rt h eu n i q u e n e s si st h a tav o t e r
in the minority group does not dare to abstain for sure because he is the only voter who can be
pivotal.
In the next section, I introduce a three-player model of endogenous abstention. If there is no
participation cost, then the only plausible (in the sense of trembling perfection) Nash equilibrium
is such that all the voters participate in voting. After that, I show for a participation cost near to
zero, the unique Nash equilibrium is such that the members in the majority participate in voting
with probability near one, and the members in the minority participate in voting with probability
near zero.
The strong imposition on the numbers of voters could be a good news for laboratory exper-
iments; our uniqueness result might be checked by experiments with just three subjects.4 The
results in the model below depend on the ratio of relative beneﬁt to participation cost, i.e. we can
1For endogenous abstention without participation cost, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999). There the
driving force of endogenous abstention is the assumption that there are two types of citizens all of whom has a
common beneﬁt: one is well-informed type and the other is uninformed type.
2Forarecentanalysisofamodelwithacontinuumofmembers, see, e.g. CoateandConlin(2002). Theirbehavioral
assumption is that each voters maximize the aggregated expected utility of the group to which they belong.
3In a companion paper, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) consider a model with incomplete information on the costs
and/or preferences of other members.
4For an experimental study of strategic voting models, see e.g. Fisher and Myatt (2002).
1normalize the beneﬁtt oaﬁxed number. But, I do not do so because for experimental purposes we
c a nh a v et w oc o n t r o l l i n gi n s truments rather than one.
2. The model
There is a social group which consists of three members. They are faced with a problem of
choosing one of two alternatives, A and B. Suppose that the number of supporters for A is two
(voters 1 and 2), and the number of supporters for B is one (voter 3). In this sense, alternative
A (resp., B) represents a majority (resp., minority) opinion in this group. We assume that these
alternatives are ﬁxed.5
A supporter for alternative x ∈{ A, B} gains u > 0i fa l t e r n a t i v ex wins, and gains nothing
if alternative y ∈{ A, B}, y  = x wins. We assume that she has to pay a (physical, mental,
opportunity, whatever) cost c ∈ [0,u/2) to participate in the decision-making or abstain from it.
After she decides to join the meeting, what she does at the meeting place is to write “A”o r“ B”o n
ab a l l o ta n dc a s tav o t e .T h er u l et od e c i d eaw i n n i n ga l t e r n a t i v ei sam a j o r i t yr u l e . 6 Lastly, what
has been described so far is common knowledge among the three members.




i ∈{ P, N},s2
i : {P, N}3 →{ Write“A”,Write“B”}},
where P means “Participate” and N means “Not Participate (i.e. Abstain).”
However, notice here that after she decided to participate in voting (i.e. s1
i = P), her choice
s2
i = “Against her preferred alternative” is a weakly dominated strategy for any observation s1
−i ∈
{P, N}2. Thus, supposing a weakly dominated strategy is not played, we will focus on endogenous
determination of {s1
i }i, i.e. what will be a Nash equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage (deciding whether to
participate or not).
We can describe the normal form of the participation game by the following matrices where
voter 1 chooses a row , 2 chooses a column and 3 chooses a matrix (P or N). The triples in each
box indicate the payoffs to voters 1, 2 and 3 in that order.
PN
P N
P u − c, u − c, −c u





2 − c, u
2 − c 0, 0, u − c
P N
P u − c, u − c,0 u − c, u,0




Let σi ∈ [0,1] be the probability of voter i’s participating in voting. The reduced normal form
for voters 1 and 2 associated with a mixed strategy σ3 of voter 3 is given by
5Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) consider a model where alternatives are not ﬁxed, but the ﬁnal decision is
af u n c t i o n( w h i c ht h e yc a l lacompromise function) of how many and what types of members have participated. Turner
and Weninger (2001) is an empirical analysis based on the results of Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000).
6When tied or nobody votes, the winner is decided by the fair lottery.
2P N
P u − c, u − c σ3(u
2 − c) + (1 − σ3)(u − c), σ3
u
2 + (1 − σ3)u
N σ3
u
2 + (1 − σ3)u, σ3(u
2 − c) + (1 − σ3)(u − c) (1 − σ3)u
2, (1 − σ3)u
2
The ﬁrst observation is that if there is no cost to participate in voting (i.e. c = 0), then there is
a continuum of Nash equilibria: any σ3 can consist of a Nash equilibrium as long as voters 1 and
2 participate in voting for sure.7
Proposition 1. If we assume that c = 0, then the set of Nash equilibria of the participation
game is given by {(1,1,σ3)|0 ≤ σ3 ≤ 1}.
Proof. If c = 0, then the normal forms deﬁned above are given as follows.
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P N
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2, (1 − σ3)u
2
If 0 <σ 3 ≤ 1, then (σ1,σ2) = (1,1) is the unique equilibrium of the reduced game since
P then strictly dominates N.I f 0<σ 3 ≤ 1, it follows that the only candidates for equilibria
in the actual three voter game belong to the set {(1,1,σ3)|0 <σ 3 ≤ 1}. Clearly, these are all
equilibria. If σ3 = 0, then the equilibria of the reduced game are precisely the strategy pairs in
the set {(1,σ2)|0 ≤ σ2 ≤ 1}∪{ (σ1,1)|0 ≤ σ1 ≤ 1}.H o w e v e r ,(σ1,σ2) = (1,1) is the only
equilibrium strategy pair of the reduced game to which σ3 = 0 is a best response by voter 3 in the
actual three voter game. This completes the proof. QED
It is easy to see that the participation game with c = 0 is nongeneric and that trembling-hand
perfection eliminates all the equilibria except (σ1,σ2,σ3) = (1,1,1) because σ3 = 1 is voter 3’s
best response to any completely mixed pair of strategies of voters 1 and 2. In all the equilibria, the
social welfare is maximized (in the case where c = 0) since the majority opinion wins for sure and
the sum of utilities is 2u.
3. Equilibrium under costly participation
7Since the game is a ﬁnite one, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is obvious.
3In this section, we are going to ﬁnd an equilibrium of the game with non zero participation
cost. The following proposition is obtained.

















Proof. First note that, in any equilibrium, it must be the case that σ3 ≤ 2c/u. To see this, notice
that if σ3 > 2c/u,t h e n(σ1,σ2) = (1,1) is the unique equilibrium of the reduced game. However,
the best response of voter 3 to (σ1,σ2) = (1,1) is σ3 = 0, a contradiction. If σ3 ≤ 2c/u,t h e n
0 ≤ (1−2c/u)/(1−σ3) ≤ 1 and straightforward arithmetic shows that the unique equilibrium of








There is no equilibrium in which σ3 = 0 since, in this case, the reduced game equilibrium is
(σ1,σ2) = (1−2c/u,1−2c/u)andvoter3’sbestresponseisσ3 = 1. Hence, voter3’sequilibrium










and solving for σ3 yields σ3 = 1−
√
1 − 2c/u from which it follows that σ1 = σ2 =
√
1 − 2c/u.
This completes the proof. QED
It is immediate to see that (σ1,σ2,σ3) → (1,1,0) as c → 0. In other words, if a participation
cost c is sufﬁciently small, then voters who belong to the majority go to the meeting place with the
probability of near one (that is, the rate of abstention is nearly zero), but a voter who belongs to the
minority goes to the meeting place with the probability of near zero (that is, the rate of abstention
is nearly one). It is also easy to see that (σ1,σ2,σ3) → (0,0,1) as c → u/2.
In equilibrium, the payoff of players 1 and 2 is
√
u(u − 2c), which is a strictly decreasing
function of the cost c. On the other hand, player 3 obtains u − c −
√
u(u − 2c), which is strictly
increasing with respect to the cost. This is because the indirect, strategic effect, by which players 1
and 2 are discouraged to go voting, is more beneﬁcial for voter 3 than the direct effect of reducing
her voting cost is.
4. Welfare
First, note that the maximum social welfare is 2u − c, which is achieved by making only one
player among players 1 and 2 participate in voting.8
8If the social planner can directly choose one alternative among the two, then the maximized social welfare is 2u,
though.
4In the class of mixed strategies (σ1,σ2,σ3) = (p, p,1 − p), the expected social welfare is
calculated as
σ1σ2σ3(2u − 3c) + σ1σ2(1 − σ3)(2u − 2c)
+(1 − σ1)σ2σ3(3u/2 − 2c) + (1 − σ1)σ2(1 − σ3)(2u − c)
+σ1(1 − σ2)σ3(3u/2 − 2c) + σ1(1 − σ2)(1 − σ3)(2u − c)
+(1 − σ1)(1 − σ2)σ3(u − c) + (1 − σ1)(1 − σ2)(1 − σ3)(3u/2)
= (1 + 3p/2 − p3/2)u − (1 + p)c.
I ti se a s yt os e et h a tp =
√
1 − 2c/(3u) maximizes the social welfare, whereas in the unique
equilibrium p =
√
1 − 2c/u, which is smaller than
√
1 − 2c/(3u). So, in equilibrium, members
in the majority group are too discouraged, and those in the minority group are too encouraged
to participate in voting from the viewpoint of the social welfare. This is caused by the free-rider
problem within the majority group. And, anticipating that, player 3, who belongs to the minority
group, becomes aggressive, though the effect of the free-riding inclination is dominant so that in
equilibrium players 1 and 2 abstain from voting with a greater probability.
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